There are, therefore, three principles of nature, and these are matter, form, and privation.One of these principles, namely, the form, is that towards which coming-to-be moves: the other two are on the side of that from which coming-to-be arises.Hence matter and privation are in the same subject but seen from different viewpoints.For it is the same subject which is both bronze and unshaped (with respect to the statue) before the advent of the form--but it is for one reason that we call it bronze and for another reason that we call it unshaped.Hence privation is called a principle, not essentially but accidentally, because it coincides with the matter; for example, we say that a doctor builds something accidentally, for the doctor builds something not in so far as he is a doctor, but in so far as he is a builder and builder coincides with doctor in one subject.Now accidents are of two kinds.There are necessary accidents which are not separated from the thing, as, for example, risibility from man; and there are non-necessary accidents which are separated, such as whiteness from man.So although privation is an accidental principle, it does not follow that it is not necessary for coming-to-be.For matter is never without privation: for in so far as the matter is under one form it has the privation of another form and viceversa.For example, in fire there is the privation of air and in air the privation of fire.
It should be noticed that although coming-to-be arises from not-being, we do not say that negation is its principle, but rather, privation; and this is because negation does not determine the subject for itself.Not-seeing can be said even of non-beings as, for example, "Chimeras do not see." Likewise it can be said of beings which are not intended by nature to have sight, such as a stone.But privation is said only of a determinate subject which is intended by nature to have a given state: thus blindness, for example, is only said of those things which are intended by nature to see.And because coming-to-be does not arise from absolute non-being but from non-being which is in a certain subject, and not in just any subject but in a determined one, (for it is not from just any non-burning thing that fire comes about, but from a non-burning thing which by nature can become the form of fire)--it is because of this that privation is a principle.But in this, privation as a principle differs from the other principles because the others are principles both in being and becoming.For that this should become a statue it is necessary that there be bronze and, ultimately, the shape of the statue: and, moreover, once it is a statue, it is again necessary that both of these exist.But privation is a principle in becoming and not in being, for while the statue is becoming it cannot be a statue.If it were a statue, it could not be becoming one, because what is becoming is only in successive stages, as are time and motion.But from that which already is a statue, there is not the privation of statue in it.Because affirmation and negation cannot exist simultaneously, similarly neither can the state and the privation of that state.And so privation is an accidental principle in the sense explained above; the other two are essential principles.
From what has already been said, it is evident that matter differs from form and from privation according to definition.For matter is that in which both form and privation are understood, just as both a shape and a lack of a shape are understood in the bronze.And sometimes the way in which we name the matter involves the notion of privation and sometimes it does not involve the notion of privation; for example, bronze, although it is the matter of the statue does not involve the notion of privation because when I say "bronze", the lack of a form or the lack of a shape is not included in my concept.On the other hand, flour, since it is the matter with respect to bread does involve in itself the privation of the form of bread, because when I say "flour" the lack of form or the disorganization opposed to the form of bread is signified.And because in coming-to-be the matter or the subject remains, but the privation does not, and neither does the composite of matter and privation, accordingly, matter which does not involve the notion of privation remains; however, that matter which does involve the notion of privation, is transitory.
It should also be noted that some matter has a composition of form; for example, although the bronze is the matter with respect to the statue, nevertheless, the bronze itself is a composite of matter and form.Therefore, bronze cannot be called prime matter because it has a matter.Only that matter which can be understood without any form and privation, but which is the subject of both form and privation, is called prime matter because there is not any other matter prior to it.And this prime matter is also called "hyle".
Because all knowledge and every definition is through the form, therefore, prime matter cannot be known or defined by itself, but by the composite: and so we say that prime matter is that which is related to all forms and all privations like the bronze is related to the statue and to the privation of some figure.
And prime matter here means prime in an absolute way.For something can also be called primary with respect to a certain genus, such as water being the prime matter in the genus of liquids.Nevertheless, water is not prime in an absolute way, because it is a composite of matter and form; hence it has a matter prior to it.
Again it should be noted that both prime matter and form neither come-to-be nor pass-away because all coming-to-be is from something to something.Now that from which the coming-to-be is from is the matter; and that to which the coming-to-be is to is the form.Therefore, if the matter or the form also come-to-be, there would be a matter of the matter and a form of the form ad infinitum.Hence, strictly speaking, only the composite comes-to-be.