Thirdly,because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience and long study,and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great Commonwealth are necessary to be known,no man is presumed to be a good counsellor but in such business as he hath not only been much versed in,but hath also much meditated on and considered.For seeing the business of a Commonwealth is this;to preserve the people in peace at home,and defend them against foreign invasion;we shall find it requires great knowledge of the disposition of mankind,of the rights of government,and of the nature of equity,law,justice,and honour,not to be attained without study;and of the strength,commodities,places,both of their own country and their neighbours';as also of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may any way annoy them.And this is not attained to without much experience.Of which things,not only the whole sum,but every one of the particulars requires the age and observation of a man in years,and of more than ordinary study.The wit required for counsel,as I have said before (Chapter VIII),is judgement.And the differences of men in that point come from different education;of some,to one kind of study or business,and of others,to another.
When for the doing of anything there be infallible rules (as in engines and edifices,the rules of geometry),all the experience of the world cannot equal his counsel that has learned or found out the rule.And when there is no such rule,he that hath most experience in that particular kind of business has therein the best judgement,and is the best counsellor.
Fourthly,to be able to give counsel to a Commonwealth,in a business that hath reference to another Commonwealth,it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences and letters that come from thence,and with all the records of treaties and other transactions of state between them;which none can do but such as the representative shall think fit.By which we may see that they who are not called to counsel can have no good counsel in such cases to obtrude.
Fifthly,supposing the number of counsellors equal,a man is better counselled by hearing them apart than in an assembly;and that for many causes.First,in hearing them apart,you have the advice of every man;but in an assembly many of them deliver their advice with aye or no,or with their hands or feet,not moved by their own sense,but by the eloquence of another,or for fear of displeasing some that have spoken,or the whole by contradiction,or for fear of appearing duller in apprehension than those that have applauded the contrary opinion.Secondly,in an assembly of many there cannot choose but be some interests are contrary to that of the public;and these their interests make passionate,and passion eloquent,and eloquence draws others into the same advice.For the passions of men,which asunder are moderate,as the heat of one brand;in assembly are like many brands that inflame one another (especially when they blow one another with orations)to the setting of the Commonwealth on fire,under pretence of counselling it.Thirdly,in hearing every man apart,one may examine,when there is need,the truth or probability of his reasons,and of the grounds of the advice he gives,by frequent interruptions and objections;which cannot be done in an assembly,where in every difficult question a man is rather astonied and dazzled with the variety of discourse upon it,than informed of the course he ought to take.Besides,there cannot be an assembly of many,called together for advice,wherein there be not some that have the ambition the ambition to be thought eloquent,and also learned in the politics;and give not their advice with care of the business propounded,but of the applause of their motley orations,made of the diverse colored threads or shreds of thread or shreds of authors;which is an impertinence,at least,that takes away the time of serious consultation,and in the secret way of counselling apart is easily avoided.Fourthly,in deliberations that ought to be kept secret,whereof there be many occasions in public business,the counsels of many,and especially in assemblies,are dangerous;and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affairs to lesser numbers,and of such persons as are most versed,and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.
To conclude,who is there that so far approves far approves the taking of counsel from a great assembly of counsellors,that wisheth for,or would accept of their pains,when there is a question of marrying his children,disposing of his lands,governing his household,or managing his private estate,especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity?A man that doth his business by the help of many prudent counsellors,with every one consulting apart in his proper element,does it best;as he that useth able seconds at tennis play,placed in their proper stations.He does next best that useth his own judgement only;as he that has no second at all.But he that is carried up and down to his business in a framed counsel,which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions,the execution whereof is commonly,out of envy or interest,retarded by the part dissenting,does it worst of all,and like one that is carried to the ball,though by good players,yet in a wheelbarrow,or other frame,heavy of itself,and retarded by the also by the inconcurrent judgements and endeavours of them that drive it;and so much the more,as they be more that set their hands to it;and most of all,when there is one or more amongst them that desire to have him lose.And though it be true that many eyes see more than one,yet it is not to be understood of many counsellors,but then only when the final resolution is in one in one man.Otherwise,because many eyes see the same thing in diverse lines,and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit;they that desire not to miss their mark,though they look about with two eyes,yet they never aim but with one:and therefore no great popular Commonwealth was ever kept up,but either by a foreign enemy that united them;or by the reputation of some one eminent man amongst them;or by the secret counsel of a few;or by the mutual fear of equal factions;and not by the open consultations of the assembly.And as for very little Commonwealths,be they popular or monarchical,there is no human wisdom can uphold them longer than the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours.